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That he derived material from a wide spectrum of theological schools which stood in blatant opposition to the Hellenic tradition of learning is expected.
Ibn Taymiyya Against the Greek Logicians
Now see Ziai, Knowledge and Illumination, 41 ff. In this case, it is clear that it was not the definition which led to forming the gdeek. Indeed, if such a concept is apprehended without definition, then these species have a greater claim to be apprehended, because they are more immediate 3 to the genus, and their individuals are well known.
A more readily identifiable source of influence is the polemical writings of the theologians, who, like Ibn Taymiyya, had earlier stood in defence of Islam against the ‘Greek heresies’. His family had long been renowned for its learningamong his teachers, was Shams ud-Din Al-Maqdisi, first Hanbali Chief Justice of Syria following the reform of the judiciary by Baibars. While the effused universe is distinguished from this Being, the generated universe none the less maintains a unitary relationship with the source of its own existence.
Umer Yousuf rated it liked it Sep 12, Their statement ‘No concepts can be formed except by means of definition’ is a negative, not a self-evident proposition. A detailed analysis of the apparent contradiction will take us beyond the bounds of this introduction. It will thus become known that for a aggainst [to be formed] there is no need for a definition.
Out of these similarities and commonalities, he will assign to the definiendum its own particular attributes. So how did they arrive at this statement? What is essential in Arabic is not necessarily so in English.
Tenth, they argue that the opponent is entitled to challenge freek definition by means of Refutation naqd —through Coextensiveness tard and Coexclusiveness ‘aks 1—as well as by introducing another, 12 1 The argument here is as follows. At other times, he integrates into one lengthy argument a variety of sub-arguments that are of a different type altogether.
We have seen that in the Avicennian tradition essence in itself has no mental or external existence, and that in order for such an essence to subsist in the two modes of existence certain qualities must be added to it.
Ibn Taymiyya Against the Greek Logicians – Wael B. Hallaq – Oxford University Press
Lists with This Book. The former 2 involves the explication of 2 See an almost identical statement about the use of definition in Maqdisi, al-Bad’ wal-Ta’rikh, i. On first appearance he seems to overlook the commonly held doctrine that even if the premiss in a syllogism is not universal, it stands, on the scale of probability, superior to analogy.
Ali Khan rated it it was amazing Aug 12, Philosophical discourse became a constant element in even traditionalist Islamic sciences. Things in the world are concomitant, and there can be no external particular that is not concomitant or conjoined in one form or another with other particulars.
The doctrine puts forth two postulates that emerge as salient features of the basic distinction between essence and accident. While the repeated use of the formula may be justifiable in light of Ibn Taymiyya’s practice of digression, it is no longer relevant to an abridgement which claims to, and in fact does, eliminate a significant See Translation, par. The borrowings from Suhrawardi, Baghdad!
This, by my life, pertains to definitions that contain no falsehood. Campbell, and Thomas Brown, voiced grievances against logic in general and the syllogism in particular. On the one hand, by refuting philosophical logic he advanced his critique of the metaphysical doctrines of falsafa, and, on the other, by under- mining logic in general and the realist theories of essences and universals in particular, he sought to shake the dogmatic foundation of mystical pantheism.
At the same time, however, Ibn Taymiyya could not see the utility of mathematical and logical knowledge for the human understanding of the real world. Thus, the number of premisses in the argument is determined by the particular needs of the reasoner, needs that vary from one person to another.
Ibn Taymiyya Against the Greek Logicians – Oxford Scholarship
But even if we assume that Sextus constituted a source of Gree Taymiyya’s criticism of the syllogism, we must insist that the latter critique represents a considerably transformed version of the Sceptic’s views. To sum up, on the basis of the meagre evidence available to us, we tentatively conclude that Ibn Taymiyya clearly owes a debt to his Greek and Muslim predecessors.
Hence, the definiendum cannot be known through definition.
In either case, however, it is through Porphyry’s five predicables that a definition or a description may be obtained. An Islamic Refutation of Aristotelian Logic: Sources of the Critique Ibn Taymiyya’s ultimate goal was the demolition of the logical foundations of philosophical metaphysics and speculative mysticism, and he considered as a candidate for adoption any argument that proved appropriate and useful for achieving that end.
The longest of these treatises, however, does not exceed a few pages. Having determined that intoxication, the cause of the judgement, is present in both date-wine and grape-wine, we transfer the judgement, namely prohibition, to date-wine.
The realism of this doctrine was bound to lead to a theory of universals that not only involved metaphysical assumptions unacceptable to such theologians as Ibn Taymiyya, but also resulted in conclusions about God and His existence that these theologians found even more objectionable.
For the aim is to reveal what the speaker intended by these names and this discourse. The claim that definitions lead to forming a concept of things is that of the Greek logicians, the followers of Aristotle, as well as of those Muslims and others who have followed their path by imitating them.
Ibn Taymiyya against the Greek Logicians
Refresh and try again. The need for more than two premisses is again attested by the logicians’ acceptance of the sorites, which is a compound syllogism consisting of a chain of syllogisms in which each term except the first and last occurs twice, once as subject and once as predicate. First, this has been reported to be their own convention. What is meant by ‘and the like’ is a description which employs accidental rather than essential attributes in forming a concept of a thing.
This is an important point that should be understood.
Sextus’ name is hardly ever mentioned in Muslim writings, and thus the only possible channel of influence conceivable is through indirect transmission of his criticism. This edition, also based on the unique Asafiyya manuscript, does not appear to make a significant advance over the edition.
Thus nothing in the external world can be apprehended without that attribute which is necessary for quiddity, whereas without the attribute necessary for existence, a lpgicians can none the less be apprehended. Why he did not make such a charge is not readily obvious.
Seen against a scale ranging from the rudimentary critique made by Ariston to the subtle and extensive arguments adduced by such later philosophers as the British empiricists, Ibn Taymiyya can be conveniently located in the second half of the continuum. Sources of the Critique xli different from that conceived by Ibn Taymiyya and the Stoicsbut was also largely irrelevant to Ibn Taymiyya’s critique. His grievance against logic was not simply that it existed, but rather that it existed in and infested the core of the Islamic religious sciences.