RFC (part 1 of 4): Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for 3rd Generation Authentication and Key Agreement (EAP-AKA). RFC Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for 3rd Generation Authentication and Key Agreement (EAP-AKA), January Canonical URL. Extensible Authentication Protocol, or EAP, is an authentication framework frequently used in EAP Transport Layer Security (EAP-TLS), defined in RFC , is an IETF open standard that uses the . EAP-AKA is defined in RFC .
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The “home environment” refers to the home operator’s authentication network infrastructure.
EAP Types – Extensible Authentication Protocol Types
It does not specify an Internet standard of any kind. The protocol only specifies chaining multiple EAP mechanisms and not any specific method.
Brute-Force and Dictionary Attacks When EAP is invoked by an This greatly simplifies the setup procedure since a certificate is not needed on every client. In addition, the private key on a smart card is typically wka using a PIN that only the owner of the smart card knows, minimizing its utility for a thief even before the card has been reported stolen and revoked.
In this document, the term nonce is only used to denote eqp nonces, and it is not used to denote counters. Archived from the original on February 9, It supports authentication techniques that are based on the following types of credentials:.
RFC – part 1 of 4
It was co-developed by Funk Software and Certicom and is widely supported across platforms. Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access.
Fall Back on Full Authentication Eeap permanent identity is usually based on the IMSI. EAP is not a wire protocol; instead it only defines message formats.
The password may be a low-entropy one and may be drawn from some set of possible passwords, like a dictionary, which is available to an attacker. The 3rd Generation AKA is not used in the fast re-authentication procedure.
EAP-TLS is still considered one of the most secure EAP standards available, although TLS provides strong security only as long as the user understands potential warnings about false credentials, and is universally supported by all manufacturers of wireless LAN hardware and software. On full authentication, the peer’s identity response includes either the user’s International Mobile Subscriber Identity IMSIor a temporary identity pseudonym if identity privacy is in effect, as specified in Section 4.
Arkko Request for Comments: Fast Re-Authentication Username The username portion of fast re-authentication identity, i. The peer has derived the same keying material, so the authenticator does not forward the keying material to the peer along with EAP-Success.
EAP Types – Extensible Authentication Protocol Types information
The packet format and the use of attributes are specified in Section 8. AKA authentication may then be retried with a new authentication vector generated using the synchronized sequence number.
The highest security available is when the “private keys” of client-side certificate are housed in smart cards. Format, Generation, and Usage of Peer Identities After the server is securely authenticated to the client via its CA certificate and optionally the client to the server, the server can then use the established secure connection “tunnel” to authenticate the client.
If the peer has maintained state information for re-authentication and wants to use fast re-authentication, then the peer indicates this by using a specific fast re-authentication identity instead of the permanent identity or a pseudonym identity.
Archived from the original PDF on 12 December Communicating the Peer Identity to the Server Pseudonym Identity A pseudonym identity of the peer, including an NAI realm portion in environments where a realm is used. EAP-AKA includes optional identity privacy support, optional result indications, and an optional fast re-authentication procedure.
Extensible Authentication Protocol
EAP-GTC carries a text challenge from rc authentication server, and a reply generated by a security token. Figure 2 shows how the EAP server rejects the Peer due to a failed authentication.
Because protected success indications are not used in this example, the EAP server sends the EAP-Success packet, indicating that the authentication was successful. The underlying key exchange is resistant to active attack, passive zka, and dictionary attack. Message Sequence Examples Informative Retrieved from ” https: